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Reconciling the Lanham Act and the
FDCA: A Comment on Chris Hurley’s
Note
Christopher B. Seaman*
I. Introduction
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola,1 the U.S. Supreme
Court unanimously2 held that a claim for false or misleading
advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act3 was not
preempted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act4 (FDCA)
simply because the allegedly false or misleading beverage label at
issue—which prominently displayed the words “pomegranate
blueberry” despite containing less than a thimbleful of either
pomegranate juice or blueberry juice5—fell within the scope of the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) regulatory authority under
the FDCA.6 Rather, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act and
the FDCA “complement each other in major respects” because
“[a]though both statutes touch on food and beverage labeling,” they
serve different objectives, as “the Lanham Act protects commercial
interest against unfair competition, while the FDCA protects

* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Frances Lewis Law Center,
Washington and Lee University School of Law. My thanks to Chris Hurley and
the Editorial Board of the Washington and Lee Law Review for inviting me to
participate in the 2017 Notes Colloquium, and my sincere gratitude for their
patience with the submission and editing of this Comment.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
2. The decision in POM Wonderful was 8-0; Justice Breyer took no part in
consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 2242.
3. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
4. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1046 (1938) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301–399h).
5. Specifically, Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid juice blend contained only 0.3%
pomegranate juice and 0.2% blueberry juice by volume. POM Wonderful, 134 S.
Ct. at 2233.
6. Id. at 2233, 2237–42.

647

648

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2018)

public health and safety.”7 Furthermore, it explained that the two
statutes’ remedial schemes are complementary as well, as the FDA
possesses the technical knowledge needed to regulate the health
and safety of various consumer products, but it lacks “the expertise
in accessing market dynamics that day-to-day competitors
possess.”8 In contrast, the Lanham Act “draws upon this market
expertise by empowering private parties to sue competitors” for
market harm caused by false advertising.9
In particular, the Court’s opinion distinguished between food
and beverage labels and other products that are more heavily
regulated by the FDA, noting that the FDA did not preapprove
juice labels, in contrast with other types of labels, such as
prescription drugs.10 This has led both commentators11 and
courts12 to question whether POM Wonderful’s holding is limited
and does not extend to other products, such as pharmaceuticals
and medical devices, which are more heavily regulated by the FDA
and require preapproval. To date, however, there has been little
discussion of an important related issue: whether a drug maker’s
promotion of a FDA-approved drug for a non-approved condition,
which is commonly known as “off-label use,” also can be subject to
claims of false or misleading advertising or promotion under
Section 43(a).13
7. Id. at 2238.
8. Id. at 2238–39.
9. Id. at 2238.
10. See id. at 2235 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) and noting “the less extensive
role the FDA plays in the regulation of food than in the regulation of drugs”).
11. See, e.g., Peter Meier & Elizabeth Dorsi, Limiting Lanham Act Claims
after
POM
Wonderful,
ABA
SEC.
LITIG.
(Dec.
17,
2014),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/fall2014
-1214-limiting-lanham-act-claims-food-and-drug-products-after-pomwonderful.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (“One question left unresolved by POM
Wonderful is the extent to which its holding applies to drugs regulated by the
FDA, as opposed to just food and beverages.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
12. See, e.g., JHP Pharms., LLC v. Hospira, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 992, 999
(C.D. Cal. 2014) (explaining that, in POM Wonderful, “the Court suggests a
difference between food labeling, which is not subject to FDA pre-approval, and
drug labeling, which is,” but ultimately declining to resolve this issue because the
plaintiff’s complaint did not adequately plead facts sufficient to plausibly
demonstrate false or misleading labeling).
13. In an important Comment, Kathryn Bi has addressed the issue of what
constitutes false or misleading advertising or promotion of off-label uses of drugs,
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Fortunately, we have Chris Hurley, who fills this important
gap in the literature with his award-winning Note. In particular,
Mr. Hurley’s Note addresses the difficult question of reconciling
the language of two complex statutes, as well as the competing
public policy concerns at play: (1) ensuring the safety and efficacy
of pharmaceutical drugs through evidence-based regulation, and
(2) preserving the ability of physicians and patients to access
information about potentially beneficial non-approved uses of such
drugs. Ultimately, Mr. Hurley argues the Court’s decision in POM
Wonderful should extend to off-label advertising and promotion
that is false or misleading, thus allowing claims against drug
makers under Section 43(a) for such conduct.14 As described
further below, while I agree with the Note’s main thesis—I
similarly would conclude that a Section 43(a) claim against false
or misleading statements related to off-label promotion is not
preempted by the FDCA—I also contend that courts should be
cautious in determining what constituted “false or
misleading . . . advertising or promotion” regarding off-label use,
for fear of chilling the dissemination of valuable information about
potentially efficacious but unapproved uses of FDA-authorized
drugs.
The remainder of this Comment proceeds as follows. Part I
addresses the issue of “off-label” promotion and explains why
off-label use of drugs are both common and beneficial in the
practice of modern medicine, but also can be problematic. Part II
covers false and misleading advertising under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, including past cases where courts permitted claims
involving the promotion of regulated pharmaceutical products to
go forward despite the FDA’s extensive regulatory process for
approving for such products under the FDCA. Part III analyzes
how the Lanham Act and the FDCA can be reconciled in the
but it only briefly touches on the POM Wonderful decision and its potential impact
with no substantive analysis of the potential preemption issue. See Kathryn Bi,
Comment, What is “False or Misleading” Off-Label Promotion?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
975, 989–90 (2015) (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decision in POM
Wonderful . . . eliminated a substantial source of legal uncertainty for prospective
plaintiffs and is likely to encourage such private-party suits in the future”).
14. See Christopher A. Hurley, Note, The Off-Label Use of POM Wonderful:
Using Section 43(a) to Eliminate Misleading Off-Label Drug Promotion, 75 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 593, 632 (2018) (“Applying POM Wonderful, then, neither the FDCA
nor its accompanying FDA regulations should bar Section 43(a) claims.”).
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context of off-label uses of FDA-approved drugs, including the role
of physicians as intermediaries in determining whether a
particular off-label use is medically appropriate. It then concludes
with a few final thoughts regarding the quality and thoughtfulness
of Mr. Hurley’s Note.
II. What are Off-Label Uses, and Why are They Important?
As a threshold matter, it is important to address what
constitutes an “off-label use” of an FDA-approved drug and why
such uses are important. As previously mentioned, the FDA is a
federal regulatory agency that is part of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services.15 The FDA’s primary mission is to
protect the American public through the regulation of numerous
products and services, including but not limited to, drugs, medical
devices, vaccines, biologics, food, beverages, dietary supplements,
cosmetics, radiation-emitting products, and tobacco products.16
Within the FDA, the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) evaluates the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs
through pre-market approval and post-market regulation.17
15. See 21 U.S.C. § 393(a) (2012) (“There is established in the Department of
Health and Human Services the Food and Drug Administration . . . .”); see also
HHS Organizational Chart, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2018) (listing the FDA as part of HHS) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 393(b); see also About FDA: What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo (last updated Dec. 29, 2017)
(last visited Jan. 29, 2018)
The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for protecting the
public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and security of human
and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices; and by
ensuring the safety of our nation's food supply, cosmetics, and products
that emit radiation. FDA also has responsibility for regulating the
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products to
protect the public health and to reduce tobacco use by minors.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See About the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedical
ProductsandTobacco/CDER/default.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2014) (last visited
Jan. 29, 2018)
The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) performs an
essential public health task by making sure that safe and effective
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Pre-market approval is a rigorous process with several stages.
First, a product sponsor (i.e., a pharmaceutical company) must
submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the
FDA.18 If approved for investigation, the drug goes through three
phases of clinical trials to evaluate safety, dosing, efficacy, and
adverse reaction (side effects).19 The final stage, Phase III, is the
most rigorous, typically lasting multiple years and involving
thousands of subjects (patients).20 After clinical trials are
complete, the company files a New Drug Application (NDA), which
the FDA investigates with the assistance of physicians and
scientists from various disciplines and sub-disciplines, including
pharmacologists, statisticians, and medical officers.21 If approved,
FDA also considers what information must be included on the
drug’s label, such as dosing information and warnings about

drugs are available to improve the health of people in the United
States. As part of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
CDER regulates over-the-counter and prescription drugs, including
biological therapeutics and generic drugs.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2017) (“Investigational new drug means a new
drug or biological drug that is used in a clinical investigation.”); id. § 312.20(a)
(“A sponsor shall submit an [investigational new drug application] to FDA if the
sponsor intends to conduct a clinical investigation with an investigational new
drug.”).
19. These clinical trials are known as Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III.
Id. §§ 312.21(a)–(c).
20. Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Drugs/ucm405622.htm (last updated
Jan. 4, 2018) (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also Kyle D. Ross et al., Drug Use, Access, and the Role of the
Pharmaceutical Industry, in INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER
FOR PHARMACISTS 141, 150 tbl. 5-1 (Robert L. McCarthy et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012)
(stating that Phase III clinical trials have a length of 3–4 years and involve
between 2000–3000 patients in clinical settings).
21. New Drug Application (NDA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDeveloped
andApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last
updated Mar. 29, 2016) (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Earlene E. Lipowski & Marcus Long, Government
Involvement in Healthcare (“The drug developer files a new drug application
(NDA) after it completes Phase III trials with the drug. The FDA reviews a
summary of results from all clinical trials and the procedures planned for the
drug’s manufacture, formulation, and quality control.”), in INTRODUCTION TO
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A PRIMER FOR PHARMACISTS, supra note 20, at 401, 413.
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potential side effects.22 The median time from start of clinical trial
to FDA approval is approximately eight years.23 The process of
drug approval is also incredibly expensive. According to a recent
study by researchers at the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development, the average industry cost of new prescription drugs
(including failed applications) is over $2.5 billion, and only 12% of
drugs that enter clinical trials are eventually approved.24 In short,
the drug approval process is costly, lengthy, and uncertain.
Once a drug is approved, physicians are generally free to
prescribe it without restriction. But in order to market the drug
(“promotion” in FDA lingo), the pharmaceutical company must
have obtained approval for a particular use.25 Prescription for a
condition other than the ones approved by the FDA is called an
“off-label” use.26
There are numerous reasons why a drug may be prescribed
off-label. First, pharmaceutical companies may not believe it is
cost-effective to apply for FDA approval via a supplemental drug
application for additional uses.27 This may occur, for example, if
22. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (explaining the requirements governing
labels for drugs, including warnings regarding adverse reactions).
23. Thomas J. Hwang et al., The FDA’s Expedited Programs and Clinical
Development Times for Novel Therapeutics, 2012-2016, 318 J. AM. MED. ASSOC.
2137, 2137 (2017).
24. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New
Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 25–26 (2016).
25. See Michael Ollove, Pressure mounts to lift FDA restrictions on off-label
drugs, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/pressure-mounts-to-lift-fda-restrictions-on-off-label-drugs/2017/10/06/
568204a0-a2f6-11e7-8cfe-d5b912fabc99_story.html?utm_ term=.c5a78f297441 (last
visited Feb. 5, 2018) (“[F]or decades drugmakers have been barred from
promoting their drugs for uses that hadn’t gone through clinical trials.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
26. See Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions (and Their
Answers) About Off-Label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC. PROC. 982, 982 (2012) (“The
most common form of [off-label drug use] involves prescribing currently available
and marketed medications but for an indication that has never received Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval. Hence, the specific use is ‘off-label’ (ie, not
approved by the FDA and not listed in FDA-required drug-labeling
information).”).
27. See id. at 985
Obtaining a new FDA approval for a medication can be costly and timeconsuming. To add additional indications for an already approved
medication requires the proprietor to file a supplemental drug
application, and, even if eventually approved, revenues for the new
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the off-label use is to treat a rare condition with few patients
(called “orphan conditions”).28 Second, if the drug in question has
become generic by falling outside of patent protection, it may lack
a corporate sponsor to bear the required expenses of the FDA
approval process because, if successful, other companies can “free
ride” off the approval because the sponsoring firm lacks
exclusivity.29 Third, off-label use may occur when the condition is
otherwise likely to be untreatable (i.e., last-resort therapy), or
when there is emerging but not yet conclusive evidence of
effectiveness.30 These types of treatments “can provide valuable
data about the effects of the drug for different conditions and
populations,” which “can then be used to inform future clinical
practice.”31
Empirical evidence demonstrates that off-label uses of
FDA-approved drugs is widespread. A 2006 study based on
nationally representative prescribing data found that
approximately 21% of all drugs were prescribed off label.32 One of
the most common off-label uses was for cardiac medications,
representing nearly half (46%) of all prescriptions for these
drugs.33 Another frequent off-label use is for psychiatric disorders
(approximately 40% according to one study), where existing
medications may not be effective for certain patients or may have
indication may not offset the expense and effort of obtaining approval.
28. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008) (explaining that off-label
uses “can provide the only available treatments for ‘orphan’ conditions”); see also
Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 989 (“Orphan drugs are medications that are
developed and used for rare, or orphan, diseases. Owing to a drug’s limited clinical
use for an orphan indication, it will typically generate insufficient profitability for
the drug’s sponsor to seek FDA approval for the narrow indication.”).
29. Stafford, supra note 28, at 1427; see also Henry Grabowski, Patents,
Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849, 851 (2002)
(“Absent patent protection, or some equivalent barrier, imitators could free ride
on . . . FDA approval and duplicate the compound for a small fraction of the
originator’s costs.”).
30. See Stafford, supra note 28, at 1427 (noting that “off-label use
includes . . . last-resort therapy” and that it permits “physicians to adopt new
practices based on emerging evidence”).
31. Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for
Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 390 (2014).
32. David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
33. Id.
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substantial negative side effects.34 Off-label use is also common for
advanced-stage cancer where other treatments have failed; by one
estimate, one-half to three-quarters of all drugs used in
chemotherapy were prescribed off label.35 Finally, pediatric
applications of drugs are another area where off-label use is
frequent, in part because the drugs that are effective in adults are
often effective in children as well, but for safety reasons clinical
trials are not feasible.36 In sum, off-label uses of approved drugs
are common and may be beneficial,37 but they also carry potential
risks, including lack of efficacy and potentially serious side
effects.38
III. Section 43(a) and Claims of False or Misleading Advertising
Involving FDA-Approved Drugs Before POM Wonderful
This Comment will now turn to Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. Congress’s purpose in enacting the Lanham Act was, inter
alia, “to regulate commerce within the control of Congress” by
“prevent[ing] fraud and deception.”39 Although the Lanham Act is
34. Darshan Kharadi et al., Off-Label Drug Use in Psychiatry Outpatient
Department: A Prospective Study at a Tertiary Care Teaching Hospital, 6 J. BASIC
& CLINICAL PHARMACY 45, 46 (2015).
35. C. Daniel Mullins et al., Recommendations for Clinical Trials of
Off-Label Drugs Used to Treat Advanced-Stage Cancer, 30 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY
661, 661 (2012) (citing Michael Soares, “Off-Label” Indications for Oncology Drug
Use and Drug Compendia: History and Current Status, 1 J. ONCOLOGY PRAC. 102,
104 (2005)).
36. See generally, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, Policy Statement:
Off-Label Uses of Drugs in Children, 133 PEDIATRICS 563 (2014); Jennifer Corny
et al., Unlicensed and Off-Label Drug Use in Children Before and After Pediatric
Governmental Initiatives, 20 J. PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 316
(2015). Congress has passed legislation, including the Best Pharmaceuticals for
Children Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 876, and the Pediatric
Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936, to help address
this issue.
37. See Bi, supra note 13, at 983 (“[O]ff-label prescriptions can have tangible
public health benefits—the medical community considers some off-label uses to
be ‘state of the art’ procedures for treating certain conditions.”).
38. See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off Label Prescribing: A Call for
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476,
476 (2009) (“Off-label prescribing is an integral part of contemporary
medicine . . . . Off-label prescribing can also harm patients, however.”).
39. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377
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best known as the federal law governing trademarks,40
Section 43(a) sweeps significantly broader by creating a federal
remedy against unfair competition.41 Specifically, Section 43(a)
prohibits and creates a civil cause of action against:
[A]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial
activities . . . .42

Initially, Section 43(a) was narrowly interpreted “as
forbidding only ‘passing-off,’ or the infringement or unauthorized
use of a trademark.”43 Indeed, Judge Charles Edward Clark of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—a former Dean of
Yale Law School—noted in a concurring opinion a decade after the
Lanham Act’s enactment that Section 43(a) was an “extensive
(2014) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)).
40. See Overview of Trademark Law, https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/
fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (“Trademarks are governed by
both state and federal law. . . . The main federal statute is the Lanham Act, which
was enacted in 1946 . . . . Today, federal law provides the main, and by and large
the most extensive, source of trademark protection . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
41. See Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Should
Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 672 (1984)
(noting that “Section 43(a) is . . . a major weapon in the fight against ‘unfair
competition”); J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is
Now Wide Awake, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45 (1996) (“Today, section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act is the preeminent federal law for asserting claims in private
litigation against two distinct types of ‘unfair competition’ . . . .”).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012).
43. Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A
Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 59–
60 (1996).
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provision covering the false description or representation of goods
introduced into commerce,” but lamented that “there is indication
here and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized [its] potential
impact.”44 But over time, “through case law interpretation and in
some times erratic spurts of growth, Section 43(a) began to fulfill
the role” as “the primary source of private remedies against several
important types of unfair competition.”45 As Professor J. Thomas
McCarthy has explained, “by the 1980s, Section 43(a) had become
a much-used and potent statute” to combat multiple forms of
unfair competition, including false or misleading statements in the
advertising and promotion of goods.46
Notably, there are numerous examples of cases brought under
Section 43(a) regarding alleged false or misleading advertising
about FDA-regulated drugs prior to POM Wonderful that were not
found to be preempted. For example, in McNeilab, Inc. v. American
Home Products Corp.,47 McNeilab, Inc. (McNeil), the manufacturer
of Tylenol, sued American Home Products (AHP), the maker of
competing product Advil, under Section 43(a) regarding AHP
commercials which claimed Advil did not cause stomach upset as
a side effect more frequently than Tylenol.48 The District Court
granted McNeil a preliminary injunction against AHP based in
part on survey evidence,49 which was affirmed on appeal by the
Second Circuit.50 There was no assertion that the FDCA
preempted McNeil’s Section 43(a) claim, even though both Advil
and Tylenol are FDA-regulated over-the-counter (OTC) drugs.
44. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546
(2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., concurring).
45. McCarthy, supra note 41, at 51.
46. Id. at 52.
47. 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1988).
48. Id. at 35. This was preceded by an earlier lawsuit by AHP against
McNeil, which alleged that McNeil had engaged in false advertising under
Section 43(a) by disseminating to physicians a safety profile that visually
compared ibuprofen to aspirin and “suggest[ed] that ibuprofen shared aspirin’s
high propensity to irritate the stomach.” Id. at 36. McNeil counterclaimed,
alleging that AHP’s advertising campaign concealed Advil’s side effects. Id. At
trial, the district court held that both parties had violated Section 43(a) and
enjoined a variety of their advertising. Id. (citing Am. Home Prods. Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
49. Id. at 37 (citing McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 675 F. Supp.
819 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
50. Id. at 37–39.
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Similarly, in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Cosprophar,
Inc.,51 the FDA approved the plaintiff’s prescription drug, Retin-A,
for treating acne.52 After its approval, the Journal of the American
Medical Association, a leading medical publication, published an
article by researchers who discovered that the active ingredient in
Retin-A (tretinoin) was also effective in treating photodamaged
skin from sun exposure.53 In the wake of this publicity,
prescriptions for off-label use of Retin-A increased dramatically.54
Cosprophar then began marketing a skin cream with an
advertisement asserting that it contained a chemical which
“belonged to the same family” as Retin-A and compared the two
products’ side effects in an allegedly misleading manner.55 Ortho
Pharmaceutical then sued Cosprophar, asserting that its
advertisements were false or misleading under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act. Although the District Court ultimately dismissed
Ortho’s complaint because it could not prove competitive injury
and thus lacked standing, which was affirmed by the Second
Circuit on appeal,56 neither court held that plaintiff’s claims were
preempted despite the involvement of an FDA-regulated drug.
In addition, there are several cases where lower federal courts
rejected claims of preemption over the manufacturing and
marketing of “knock-off” drugs prior to POM Wonderful.57 For
instance, in Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Breckenridge
Pharmaceutical, Inc.,58 the district court held that defendant’s
claim that its product was bioequivalent to plaintiff’s prescription
drug was actionable under Section 43(a) and not preempted under

51. 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 692.
53. Id. (referring to Jonathan S. Weiss et al., Topical Tretinoin Improves
Photoaged Skin: A Double-Blind Vehicle-Controlled Study, 259 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
527 (1988)).
54. See id. (according to plaintiff’s own estimate, nearly half of Retin-A’s
sales were for off-label use).
55. Id. at 692–93.
56. Id. at 694–97.
57. See generally Solvay Pharms., Inc., v. Glob. Pharms., 298 F. Supp. 2d 880
(D. Minn. 2004).
58. 388 F. Supp. 2d 967 (E.D. Wis. 2005).

658

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2018)

the FDCA.59 Likewise, in Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari,60 the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss
plaintiff’s Section 43(a) claim that defendant had falsely alleged
that its drug was bioequivalent to plaintiff’s.61
Despite this body of case law, Congress has failed to amend
Section 43(a) to expressly exclude claims for regulated drugs under
the FDCA, despite enacting numerous other changes to the
Lanham Act since the mid-1980s (including amendments to other
parts of Section 43).62 As a result, Congress’s failure to amend
either the Lanham Act or the FDCA to overturn these decisions
and expressly preempt Section 43(a) claims involving advertising
for FDA-regulated drugs means that Congress has likely
acquiesced in allowing such claims. Under the so-called
“acquiescence rule,” “if Congress does not overturn a judicial or
administrative interpretation it probably acquiesces in it.”63 As the
Supreme Court explained in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,64 “[t]he
long time failure of Congress to alter [a statute] after it had been
judicially construed . . . is persuasive of legislative recognition that
the judicial construction is the correct one.”65 The acquiescence
rule thus provides further support for Mr. Hurley’s thesis that the
FDCA does not preempt Section 43(a) claims regarding advertising
and promotion of off-label uses.

59. Id. at 973–75.
60. 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 1137–38.
62. See generally, e.g., Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100667, 102 Stat. 3935; Federal Trademark Revision Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,
120 Stat. 1730; Madrid Protocol Implementation Act, Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat.
1758 (2002); Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat.
1730 (2006); Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property
Act of 2008 (PRO-IP Act), Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256.
63. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 68, 69 (1988).
64. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
65. Id. at 488–89; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972)
(“Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decision to stand for so long
and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not
to approve of them legislatively.”).
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IV. Reconciling Section 43(a) and the FDCA Regarding
Promotion of Off-Label Uses
In short, I agree with the primary thesis in Mr. Hurley’s Note
that claims under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act regarding
off-label uses of drugs are not barred as a matter of law, based in
part on the history of such claims prior to POM Wonderful as
described in the previous section, as well as the analysis in POM
Wonderful itself that explains how the two statutes are
complementary rather than competing in their objective to prevent
false or misleading statements regarding FDA-regulated products.
For policy reasons, however, I recommend that courts tread with
some caution in this area, as an overly-broad reading of what
constitutes false or misleading advertising may chill the
dissemination of valuable information by a drug maker regarding
potentially life-saving off-label uses.
Some claims regarding off-label use would clearly run afoul of
Section 43(a). For instance, an allegation that a drug has been
approved by the FDA to treat a certain condition, when it has not
in fact been so approved, would clearly be a false statement that
violates Section 43(a). Similarly, if a drug maker claims that an
FDA-approved drug is efficacious for treating another, unapproved
condition, but then-existing clinical data in the medical literature
does not support this claim, then it would likely be false or
misleading under Section 43(a).66
Other assertions, however, may present a more difficult case.
For instance, the FDA defines “misbranding” under the FDCA as
any promotion by drug makers of an off-label use.67 But this sort
of “misbranding” does not necessarily involve false or misleading
statements under Section 43(a). For example, if a reliable
post-approval study or trial found that a drug was efficacious and
safe for treating an unapproved condition, the maker of the drug
should be able to communicate that result to physicians.68 To hold
66. See generally Bi, supra note 13, at 1015–18.
67. See Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 988 (“[T]he FDA prohibits
‘misbranding’ of medications. Misbranding includes labeling a medication with
misleading information, including off-label uses.”).
68. The 1997 FDA Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296,
provides support for this outcome, as it “allow[s] manufacturers to distribute to
health care providers peer-reviewed journal articles about unapproved uses of
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otherwise would limit the ability of drug companies to disseminate
important information.
Furthermore, there is an important difference between a
Section 43(a) claim of a false or misleading statement—which
generally involves advertising aimed to an ordinary consumer—
and promotion of an off-label use of an approved drug, which are
typically directed at highly-trained and educated physicians. To
borrow a term from tort law, these physicians operate as “learned
intermediaries”69 who can use the information provided by drug
makers to exercise their professional judgment about whether to
prescribe an off-label use for their patients.70
V. Conclusion
Despite these modest qualifications, Mr. Hurley’s Note is a
model of student scholarship—it rigorously addresses a timely,
important, and difficult problem; it demonstrates a deep
understanding of multiple intersecting areas of law; it takes a
normative position on the dispute; and it supports that position
with both legal authority and well-reasoned argument.71 Future
medications.” Wittich et al., supra note 26, at 988. The FDA also revised its
guidelines in 2009 to allow distribution of off-label use by pharmaceutical firms if
specific regulations were followed. Id.; see also Bi, supra note 13, at 983
(explaining the “scientific-exchange exception to the general bar on off-label
speech” “permit[s] drugmakers and physicians to communicate the underlying
science about off-label uses”).
69. The learned intermediary doctrine is a defense to a product liability
claim, wherein a manufacturer of a product can discharge its duty to warn
consumers by communicating such information to a learned third party, such as
a physician. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) (AM. LAW
INST. 1998); see also Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule
for the New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 196 (2004)
(explaining that under the learned intermediary doctrine, “the mere fact that a
prescription drug is at issue in a failure-to-warn case automatically vitiates the
manufacturer’s duty to warn the end user of dangers posed by the product” with
only a few limited exceptions).
70 .See Bi, supra note 13, at 1008 (“[T]he audience for an off-label claim
should . . . include any medical professional who makes prescribing decisions.”).
71. See also Christopher B. Seaman, Comment, Comment on “Groove is in
the Hart”: A Workable Solution for Applying the Right of Publicity to Video Games,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 399, 407 (2015) (praising another Note as “an excellent
piece of student scholarship—it is clearly written, well organized, and makes a
valuable contribution to the resolution of a difficult problem that has perplexed
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Law Review staffwriters working on their own Notes would do well
to carefully study what Mr. Hurley has done and emulate it in their
own scholarship.

courts and scholars alike for decades”).

